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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARMENT-MISCONDUC.-IN RE ROBERTSON
Er AL., 132 N. W. REP., 684, (S. D.)-Held, that an attorney who fails to
properly report collections and to keep adequate books relating thereto
and his other business, and who is guilty of gross carelessness in not
knowing the facts when writing a letter concerning collections, will not
be disbarred for misconduct.
An attorney is an officer of the court. Penobscot Bar v. Kimball, 64
Me., 140; Ex-parte Garland, 4 Wall (U. S.), 333; State v. Hanaford, 43
W. Va., 773. Therefore the court has power to disbar him from practice.
Ex-parte Thompson, 32 Ore., 499; in re Duncan, 64 S. C., 461; Jackson v.
State, 21 Tex., 668. And in general attorneys may be disbarred at the
discretion of the court for malpractice and unprofessional conduct. In re
Boone, 83 Fed., 944; in re Smith, 73 Kan., 243; State v. Stitles, 48 W. Va.,
425. Misconduct as to client is conduct justifying disbarment. People
v. Mead, 29 Colo., 344; People v. Payson, 215 Ill., 476; Tudor v. Corn-
monwealth, 27 Ky. Law Rep., 87. Misappropriation of client's funds and
failure to account is such misconduct. People v. Betts, 26 Colo., 521;
in re Burris, 101 Cal., 624; Jeffries v. Lawrie, 27 Fed., 195; in re Temple,
33 Minn., 343. But Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C., 1, holds that where an
attorney, losing the money while drunk and being now insolvent, does not
pay over, he will not be disbarred. And mere carelessness and negligence in
general is not sufficient ground for disbarment. In re Lenz, 65 N. J. L.,
134; in re Veeder, 11 N. Mex., 43. Likewise misstatements to clients which
do not defraud will not cause disbarment. In re Collins, 147 Cal., 8; People
v. Robinson, 32 Colo., 241; in re Duncan, 64 S. C., 461. And in re Thresher,
29 Mont., 11, holds that retention of funds by an attorney to satisfy his
personal claims does not merit disbarment.
DAMAGES-MENTAL SUFFERING-WVILLFUL INJURY.-DAVIDSON V. LEE,
139 S. W., 904. (TEx.)-Held, that the rule that damages are not recover-
able for mental suffering, unaccompanied by physical injury, is inapplic-
able where the wrong complained of is a willful one, intended by the
wrongdoer to produce mental anguish, or from which such result should
be reasonably anticipated.
The rule stated in the leading case has been approved by several other
courts. Williams v. Underhill, 71 N. Y. Supp., 291; Davis v. Railway Co.,
35 Wash., 203. And it has been said that such damages are recoverable
whether the wrongful act was willful or merely negligent. R. R. Co. v.
Christison, 39 Ill. App., 495. They may be recovered in an aCtion for
disturbing a grave. Bessemer Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala., 135; Meagher v.
Driscoll, 99 Mass., 281. In a similar case the rule is stated that wherever
an act is a violation of a legal right, damages for mental suffering can be
recovered, if they were the proximate and natural consequence of the
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wrongful act. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn., 307. Such damages were allowed
in an action against a common carrier by a passenger who was kissed by
the conductor against her will. Craker v. R. R. Co., 36 Wis., 657.
They have often been allowed in actions for the non-delivery or delay in
delivering a telegram, where the company had notice that such failure
or delay would probably cause mental suffering. Young v. Telegraph Co.,
107 N. C., 370; Reese v. Telegraph Co., 123 Ind., 294; Telegraph Co. v.
Cooper, 71 Tex., 507. But other courts held the contrary. Chase v. Tele-
-graph Co., 44 Fed., 554; Summerfield v. Telegraph Co., 87 Wis., 1. In any
case, such damages are recoverable for intense suffering only, and not
for more disappointment or regret. Hancock v. Telegraph Co., 137 N. C.,
497.
DISCRETION OF COURT-NEw TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL.-
DOWNEY v. FINUCANE ET AL., 130 N. Y. Supp., 988.-After the jury had
retired for deliberation and in the absence of the presiding justice, counsel
sent a newspaper statement which had been ruled out appended to an
exhibit which the jury had called for. Held, in view of the trial court's
positive instructions to disregard the statement, that the conduct of coun-
sel was not such misconduct as to require a reversal of the order denying
a new trial therefor. McLennan, P. J., dissenting.
The granting or refusing of a new trial on grounds of misconduct is
a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court and the decision of the
court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is made affirmatively to
appear that, that discretion has been abused prejudicially. Sunberg v.
Babcock, 66 Iowa, 515; Loucks v. C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 31 Minn., 526;
Tucker v. Salem Flouring Mills Co., 13 Ore., 28; Olsen v. Giersten, 42
Minn., 407. Whether misconduct is prejudicial is to be determined by the
trial court, Watson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 42 Minn., 46, but in their
decision the court uses a legal discretion which must be exercised in
accordance with the rules of law under penalty of reversal, Stockwell v.
C. C. & D. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 470. On appeal the prejudicial effect respect-
ively of-Misconduct of jury or party, Harem v. Romine, 98 Ind., 77.
Improper influence of jury by counsel, Knowles v. Van Gorder, 23 Minn.,
197. Comments to jury in absence of judge on facts not in evidence,
Halls v. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559. Improper remarks to jury, Conn. v. White,
148 Mass., 430. Comments to third parties in jury's presence, Shea v.
Lawrence, 83 Mass., 167. Disclosure by counsel to jury of the contents of
a paper sought to be introduced in evidence, Met. Str. Ry. Co. v. Powell,
89 Ga., 601,--has been held to lie within the discretion of the trial court.
INFANTS-DISAFFIRMANCE OF DEEDS-LmiTATION.-PuTNAL v.
WALKER, 55 So., 844 (FLA.).-Held, that where no estoppel arises against
an infant at the time he makes a deed during infancy, and when there are
no circumstances and no affirmative acts of his making it inequitable for
him to remain inactive after attaining his majority, his mere silence or
inertness for a period less than seven years, as fixed by the statute of
limitations, after he reaches his majority, does not bar his right to dis-
affirm his deed made during infancy.
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The rule stated in the leading case is supported by the decisions of the
Federal courts, and of those of many of the States. Irvine v. Irvine, 9
Wall., 617; Wilson v. Branch, 77 Va., 65; Cressinger v. Lessee of Welch,
15 -Ohio, 156; Voorhees v. Voorhees, 24 Barb., 150 (N. Y.); Prout v. Wiley,
28 Mich., 164. On the other hand, almost an equal number of courts hold
that the deed must be disaffirmed by the infant within a reasonable time
after reaching majority, and the reasonableness is to be determined in
view of all the circumstances. Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn., 494; Hastings v.
Dollarhide, 24 Cal., 195; Goodnow v. Lumber Co., 31 Minn., 468; Searcy
v. Hunter, 81 Tex., 644. This seems to be the English rule. Holmes v.
Blogg, 8 Taunt., 35; Dublin Railway v. Black, 8 Exch., 181. In some states
this is a statutory provision. Wright v. Germain, 21 Ia., 585; Bentley v.
Greer, 100 Ga., 35; Johnston v. Gerry, 34 Wash., 524. Where the facts are
not disputed, the question of reasonableness is for the court. Goodnow
v. Lumber Co., 31 Minn., 468. Some courts hold that, while the deed must
be disaflirmed within a reasonable time, as a matter of law the time fixed
by the statute of limitations within which an action to recover hind -must
be brought is a reasonable time. Blankenship v. Stoat, 25 Ill., 132.
INJUNCTION-DAMAGES-ATTORNEY'S FEEs.-ALBERS COMIMIISSION Co.
ET AL. V. SPENCER ET AL., 139 S. W., 321 (Mo.)-Held, that attorney's fees
for services incurred by defendant in procuring the dissolution of a tem-
porary injunction wrongfully sued out are a part of the damages, but
wherd the injunction was dissolved below, the services of attorneys to
resist its re-establishment on appeal, there being no supersedeas, cannot
be recovered on the bond.
The weight of authority, as pointed out in High on Injunctions, Sec.
1685, sustains the right to recover attorney's fees paid in procuring the
dissolution of an injunction. Keith v. Henklentan, 173 IIl., 137; Wisconsin
AM. & F. Ins. Co. Bank v. Durner, 114 Wis., 369; Porter v. Hopkins, 63
Cal., 53. And yet in the Federal courts the rule is well established that
counsel fees are not a proper element of damage in a suit upon an injunc-
tion bond. Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. S., 530; in re
Hinew, 144 Fed., 147. And such is the rule in a number of States.
Wisecarver v. Wisecarver, 97 Va., 452; Sensening v. Parry, 113 Pa., 115.
The majority of States refuse to extend the damages recoverable to coun-
sel fees sustained after the injunction has been dissolved and an appeal
taken. Cors v. Tompkins, 51 Ill., App. 315; Elmwood Mfg. Co. v. Rankin,
70 Ia., 403. And thus in Neiser v. Thomas, even though the dissolution
was accompanied by a supersedeas bond. Frdinch Piano Co. v. Porter, 134
Ala., 302.
INSURANCE-FRATERNAL INSURANcE-PARTIES ENTITLED To FUNDS-
ROYAL LEAGUE V. SHIELDS, 96 N. E., 45 (ILL.) .- Held, that where a frater-
nal benefit association is organized to issue certificates for the benefit of
the families, heirs, relatives of, or persons dependent on, the member, the
designation of a person not within the classes enumerated is void and the
funds go to the 'beneficiary designated by law. Vickers, Cartwright, and
Farmer, J., dissenting.
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In general, the certificate of membership and the law under which the
association was incorporated govern who may be entitled to the funds.
Kirkpatrick v. Modern Woodmen, 103 Il1. App., 468; Gillam v. Dale, 69
Kan., 362; Mutual Benefit Asso. v. Rolfe, 76 Mich., 146. And the weight
of authority seems to hold, that where the statute designates certain classes
of relatives or dependents, a dependent is one who relies upon the member
in some material degree for support resting on some moral, legal, or equit-
able ground, and not where the assistance is trivial, casual, or wholly char-
itable. Joyce on Insurance, Sec. 773; Caldwell v. Grand Lodge, 148 Cal.,
195; Sup. Lodge, Knights of Honor v. Nairn, 60 Mich., 44; West v.
A. 0. U. W. of Texas, 14 Tex. Civ. App., 471. Some cases hold under
such a statute that the members of the family must also be dependent
Smith v. Boston &c. R. R. Relief Asso., 168 Mass., 213; "Lister v. Lister,
73 Mo. App., 99. Contra, Klotz z'. Klotz, Jr., 15 Ky., Law Rep., 183;
Donithorn v. I. 0. 0. F., 209 Pa., 170; Klee v. Klee, 93 N. Y. Supp., 588.
So where the designation of beneficiary is invalid, ineffectual, or fails, the
funds go to the heirs or other persons designated by the law. Caudell v.
Woodward, 96 Ky., 646; Dale v. Brumbly,-96 Md., 674; Wolf v. District
Grand Lodge, 102 Mich., 23. But Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. v. Cleghorn,
42 S. V. (Tex.), 1043; holds that the fund reverts to the society in accord-
ance with the by-laws. And the society alone, and not third persons, may
waive the right to take advantage of defective designations. Taylor v.
Hair, 112 Fed., 913; Tepper v. Royal Arcanum, 61 N. J. Eq., 638; Maguire
v. Supreme Council, 69 N. Y. Supp., 61, and Beard v. Sharp, 100 Ky., 606,
hold that the person illegally designated who has paid the member's dues
may only retain the amount of such dues; but Gruber v. Grand Lodge,
A. 0. U. W., 79 Minn., 59, holds the society estopped from refusing pay-
ment after receiving dues.
LIFE ESTATES-CORPORATE STOCK-NEW STOCK.-BALLANTINE V. YOUNG,
81 ATL., 119 (N. J.).-Held, that where corporate stock was bequeathed to
one for life, remainder to another, and the corporation, in the form of
dividend, issued new stock to the stockholders, the stock so issued is an
extraordinary dividend, and must be apportioned between the life-tenant
and the remainderman.
This doctrine that so much of the stock dividends as represent the
surplus profits accumulated during the lifetime of the testator will be con-
sidered as part of the corpus of the estate and go to the remainderman,
while so much as represent earnings made after his death are income, and
therefore payable to the life-tenant, has been followed in but a small
number of States. In Smith's Estate, 140 Pa., 344; Holbrook v. Holbrook,
74 N. H., 201. According to the English rule the intention of the corpora-
tion is made determinative.. In re Bouch, L. R. 29 Ch. Div., 635. In
Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S., 549, stock dividends were regarded as an
-accretion to the capital. A number of American courts regard cash divi-
dends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as
capital. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass., 101; Boardman v. Mansfield. 79 Conn.,
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634. At the other extreme stand the decisions that dividends of stock are
non-apportionable, the whole belonging to the life-tenant, although a por-
tion of it may have been earned before the death of the testator. Hite v.
Hite, 93 Ky., 257; Millen v. Guerrard, 67 Ga., 284. A still different test is
used in Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Ia., 215, in which case the decision is made
to depend upon whether these stock dividends represent profits on the
original stock, or merely the natural increase in its value.
ARENT AND CIiLD-EMANCIPATION-MARRIAGE.-AuSTIN V. AUSTIN,
132 N. W. REP., 495 (MIcH.).-Held. that marriage alone does not eman-
cipate a male minor.
A parent has the right to the services of a minor child. Ditfield v,
Cross, 12 IIl., 397; Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass., 113; Halliday v. Miller,
29 W. Va., 424. But this right is lost by emancipation of the minor.
Bristor v. Railway Co., 128 Iowa, 479; Carthage v. Canton, 97 Me, 473;
Whiting v. Earle & Tr., 3 Pick. (Mass.), 201. Outside of his relations
to his parents, a minor's marriage is of practically no effect on his status.
Taunton v. Plymouth, 15 Mass., 203; Porch v. Fries, 18 N. J. Eq., 204;
Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 119. Marriage emancipates a female
minor. State ex rel. Scott v. Lowell, 78 Minn, 166;Aldrich v. Bennett, 63
N. H., 415; Grayson v. Lofland, 21 Tex. Civ. App., 503. But Guillebart v.
Grenier, 107 La., 614, holds contra, when the consent of the parents is not
obtained. And the better rule apparently is, contrary to the principal case,
that marriage emancipates a male minor. Dick v. Grissom, 1 Freem. Ch.
(Miss.), 434; Sherburne v. Hartland, 37 Vt., 528. Commonwealth v.
Graham, 157 Mass., 73, holds that a male minor is at least emancipated to
the extent of his earnings necessary for the support of his family. But
there is authority for the view that marriage without consent of the par-
ents does not emancipate a male minor. Maillefer v. Saillot, 4 La. Ann.,
375; White v. Henry, 24 Me., 531.
PAYMENT-MEDIUM.-STROUT V. Joy, 80 ATLANTIC, 830 (ME.) .- Held,
that an agreement to do work "for the sum of $200 to be paid for in loam"
at a fixed rate per yard gives the debtor an option to pay in cash though
the loam is worth more.
In accordance with the principal case, there is a presumption in favor
of the debtor when an agreement is made to pay in something else than
money, and a note payable in property may be discharged by tendering the
amount of cash instead of the specific chattel. Pinney v. Gleason, 5 Wend.,
393. Or, where the right is payable either in property or in money at the
election of the debtor he may compel the creditor to accept property
instead of money. Nipp et al. v. Diskey, 81 Ind., 214. In the case where
an option is given by contract, the debtor has the right of election until the
debt is due-then the obligee can have the option. Ireland v. Montgomery,
34 Ind., 74; Patchin v. Swift, 22 Vt., 292. Still other cases while denying
an election will arbitrarily grant a recovery in money-and while payment
must be made in money unless a different medium is expressed, if the
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agreement be one to pay in something other than money, the law will
award a money compensation for a breach. Duerson et al. v. Bellows, 1
Blackf. 217; New York News Pub. Co. v. National S. S. Co., 148 N. Y., 39;
Perry v. Smith, 22 Vt., 301; Van de Vanter v. Redelsheimer, 107 Wash.,
847. The amount of money specified-not the value of the property-is
the determining element. Brooks v. Hubbard, 3 Conn., 58. Furthermore
it has been held that the intention of the parties is important in determin-
ing whether the defendant is to have the privilege of paying in money or
a specified article. Corey v. Phila. etc., Petroleum Co., 33 Cal., 694; Sowers
v. Earnhart, 60 N. C., 96.
QUIETING TITLE-NATURE OF REMEDY-GROUNDS FOR RELIEF.-MAYNOR
v. TYLER LAND CO., 139 S. AV., 393 (Mo.)-Held, that in a suit to quiet
title, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree, if his title be good against the
defendant.
The rule stated in the leading case is supported by some other
decisions. DeNola v. Alison, 143 Cal., 106; Brewing Co. v. Taylor, 204 Ill.,
132. But many cases hold that in a suit to quiet title, the plaintiff must
recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of Khis
adversary's. Land Co. v. Bigelow, 77 Ark., 338; Guarantee Co. v. Delta
Co., 104 Fed., 5; Krotz v. Lumber Co., 34 Ind. App., 577. An equitable title
is enough as against one having neither title nor possession.
Lumber Co. v. Bailey, 22 Ky. Law Rep., 1264. But the plaintiff
can not base his suit on a mere right to specific performance
Hennefer v. Hays, 14 Utah, 324. At least as against his vendor. Chase v.
Cameron, 133 Cal., 231. A title based on adverse possession, good against
the defendant, is sufficient. Clemmnons v. Coxr, 114 Ala., 350; Vier v.
Detroit, 111 Mich., 646. So is a title obtained through fraud, where the
grantors have not disaffirmed the transaction, and the defendant does not
claim through them. Ponce v. Long, 38 Ind. App., 63. Most courts hold
that the plaintiff must show that he is in possession. Orton v. Smith, 18
How., 263; Hardin v. Jones, 86 Ill., 313; Haythorn v. Margerein, 7 N. J.
Eq., 324. Or that the land is unoccupied. O'Brien v. Creitz, 10 Kan., 202;
Lamb v. Farrell, 21 Fed., 5. But a few decisions hold that this is unneces-
sary. Lees v. Wetmore, 58 Ia., 170; Bausinan v. Kelley, 38 Minn., 197.
RAILROADS-TRESPASSERS ON TRAcK-DUTIES OF RAILROAD.-SOUTHERN
RAILROAD Co. v. CAMPBELL, 71 S. E., 934 (GA.)-Held, that a railroad com-
pany in the operation of its trains owes to a trespasser upon its tracks no
duty, save that of not injuring him wilfully or wantonly.
A railroad track, except at public crossings or upon public highways,
is the exclusive property of the railroad company; and all persons who go
upon the tracks, except at such places, without the company's express or
implied permission, are trespassers, and, subject to certain qualifications,
do so at their own peril. L. C. Ry. Co. v. Godfrey, 71 Ill., 500; Clark v.
N. Y. C., 93 N. Y. Supp., 525. To avoid liability the company must have
been simply in the exercise of ordinary care. Remer v. Long Island Ry., I
N. Y. Supp. 124. It would seem that the company's negligence must have
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been such as to warrant a presumption of wilfulln~ss. W. & A. Ry. v.
Meigs, 74 Ga., 857. There is authority for the statement that mere care-
lessness of its employees does not render the company liable. Union S. &
T. Co. v. Goodman, 91 Ill. App., 426; Lando v. C. St. P. Al. & 0. Ry., 81
Minn., 279. But when employees have cause to anticipate the presence of
persons on tracks the degree of care required is greatly advanced. Southern
Ry. v. Chatnman, 124 Ga., 1026. No duty has ever been held to be incum-
bent upon a railroad to maintain flag-men or alarm bells, where only
trespassers would be expected to pass. I. C. Ry. v. Oberhofer, 76 IlL_ App.
672.
TAXATIoN-PROPERTY SUBJECT-PuBLIC PROPERTY.-PEOPLE V. PURDY,
130 N. Y. Supp., 1077 Held, that property condemned by a municipality
for public use was found to be unnecessary for the object for which it
was condemned does not render it subject to taxation on the theory of
municipal private ownership.
The general rule that property held by a municipality for public use is
exempt from taxation is well established. Wayland v. Middlesex Co., 4
Gray, Mass., 500; Newark v. Verona, 59 N. J. L., 94; Dist. No. 551 v. -
Sacramento Co., 134 Cal., 477. But municipal property used in commer-
cial capacity as a private corporation for its own profit is taxable. Essex
Co. v. Salem, 153 Mass., 141; Robb v. Philadelphia, 12 Pa. Dist., 423. Fur-
thermore, if a city purchases land partly for public uses and partly for
private purposes, to derive gain therefrom, only that portion used for the
public object is not taxable. Newark, v. Clinton, 49 N. J. L., 370. But if
property so used cannot be separated, the whole is subject to taxation.
Swanton v. Highgate, 81 Vt., 152. Or if more land than necessary is
bought, without any intention of using it for public purposes, it will not
be exempt. Town of Hartford v. Water Com'sr of City of Hartford, 44
Conn., 360. However, land obtained for public use, even if not imme-
diately necessary and not appropriated to such use, is held not subject to
taxation. Jersey City Water Com'rs v. Gaffney, 34 N. J. L., 131. Under a
general taxation law, there is an implied exemption in favor of property
for public use. Worcester County v. Worcester, 116 Mass., 193. But this,
is not true in Illinois. Sanitary Dist. v. Martin, 173 Ill., 243. If there is
an express exemption, then all the property of a municipality is exempt
regardless of its use. Newark v. Belleville, 61 N. J. L., 455. The property
must be owned by the city; a mere reversionary interest for instance, is
not sufficient to support exemption from taxation. Fall. v. Marysville, 19
Cal., 391. Nor is it enough that the state may be ultimately entitled to
share in the proceeds of the property. Ryan v. Callatin Co., 14 Ill., 78.
Where the property of the municipality is outside the city limits, some
courts hold that it is not exempt. Newport v. Unity, 68 N. H., 587.
Nevertheless, the better rule sustains the exemption. Rochester v. Rush,
80 N. Y., 302. Of course, a municipality having general powers of taxa-
tion may tax its own property. Norfolk v. Perry Co., 108 Va., 28. So
the State, in the absence of constitutional prohibition, may tax the prop-
erty of its municipal corporations. Public School Trustees v. Trenton, 30
N. J. Eq., 667.
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TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS-MOTIVE AFFECTING LIABILITY.-
DUNSHIE v. STANDARD OIL Co. ET AL., 132 N. W., (IA.).-Held, it is not
the law that, if one does a thing which otherwise would not transgress
the bounds of legitimate competition, his motive in doing it can not affect
the question of his liability to one injured by his act; so, where plaintiff,
being engaged in retailing oil, and having commenced to buy part of his
supply from another defendant, a wholesaler, defendant, with no real
purpose or desire to establish a competing retail business, went into the
retail business under the guise or pretense of competition, with malicious
purpose of ruining the plaintiff, or driving him out of business, intending
itself to retire from the retail business when its end was secured, it can
claim no immunity under the rules protecting competition, but is liable for
injury to plaintiff.
The general trend of authority in this country as expressed in trade
cases, is to declare actionable acts which are done solely out of bad
motive, without justifiable cause and which naturally tend to do injury.
Moran v. Duiphy, 177 Mass., 435; Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla., 206;
International Co. v. Greenwood, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 76. But, other courts
hold that an act legal in itself is not rendered actionable by the motive
which induced it. Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y., 39; Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis,
54 Minn., 223. Although the motive be malicious, yet if the main purpose
of of the defendant is to defend and protect his own business and not
merely to injure the plaintiff, he is not liable. Clendon Iron Co. v. Uhler,
75 Pa. St. 467. Trans. Co. v. Standard, Oil Co., 50 W. Va., 611. On the
other hand good motive does not of itself constitute a justification for
the violation of a right. Cooley on Torts (Students' Ed.), p. 46. Com-
petition constitutes a prima facie justification. Mogul S. S. Co. v.
McGregor, L. 1E App. Cases 25. What -may be a legal act, though done
with bad motive by an individual, becomes actionable when done by a
combination of persons. Hawarden v. Youghioiheny L. & C. Co., 1ll
Wis., 545. In determining questions of defendant's liability in trade cases,-
courts disergard any event or antecedent act which may be cause of the
motive. Casey v. Cincinnati Typ. Union. 45 Fed., 135; Brace Brothers v.
Evans, 18 Pitts. L. J.,, 399. So courts regard the immediate motive as
affecting or not affecting the liability of the defendant and not the ultimate
motive. National Ass'n. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y., 315. This motive or
malice,.if not manifestly inherent in act, compels plaintiff to give some
proof from which it may legally be inferred,' Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J.,
481. When question of punitive damages arise motive becomes very
important. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 141 Ala., 335.
